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1 Introduction
Standard first-best results on the gains from trade require demonstrating
the existence of a competitive equilibrium with lump-sum redistribution
arranged to ensure that everybody gains — or at least nobody loses —
relative to the status quo. When there are no public goods, in Hammond
and Sempere (2006) we present similar results on the gains from migration.
There the main obstacle to proving a suitable existence theorem was the
obvious non-convexity that arises because no potential migrant can be in
more than one place at the same time. Nevertheless, in a continuum economy
with appropriately dispersed agent characteristics, standard assumptions
ensuring gains from trade also ensure gains from migration.
A second apparent obstacle to achieving a potential Pareto improvement
from free migration arises from public goods and externalities, which are ig-
nored in most of the existing literature on gains from trade. Yet neglecting
local public goods subject to congestion seems especially damaging.1 Be-
cause the cost of providing such goods is obviously affected by migration, no
simple extension of our earlier results is possible. Nevertheless, we argue in
this paper that potential gains from trade and from appropriate migration
remain possible, provided that both the provision of public goods and the
congestion levels affecting those goods are frozen at their status quo lev-
1We recall the important distinction between pure public goods and public goods sub-
ject to congestion. Examples of pure public goods include broadcast radio or television,
streetlighting, etc., whose cost of provision is not directly related to population, so is
unaffected by migration or congestion. If all public goods were of this kind, routine mod-
ifications of our earlier results imply that Pareto gains from free migration are possible
in an economy where the supplies of public goods in each nation or locality are frozen at
their status quo levels.
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els. Of course, such results do not exclude additional potential Pareto gains
from appropriate changes in public good supply and/or congestion levels.
Our point is that such changes are not needed in order to allow potential
Pareto gains to emerge from a combination of free trade and free exchange
of population.
The paper is organized as follows. First, sections 2–3 describe the basic
model. Section 4 introduces congestion costs, as well as appropriate res-
idence charges that can mediate efficient population exchange. Section 5
defines “sagacious” wealth distribution rules. Section 6 demonstrates exis-
tence of a (suitably constrained) compensated equilibrium. Section 7 intro-
duces additional assumptions required to ensure that at least one commodity
price is positive in that compensated equilibrium. Finally, using appropriate
dispersion and convexity assumptions, Section 8 demonstrates the main re-
sult that there is an appropriate conditional competitive equilibrium. This
proves that potential Pareto gains from adding free migration to free trade
are possible even in the presence of national or local public goods subject
to congestion. Section 9 provides a brief concluding discussion.
2 Notation, Model and Basic Assumptions
2.1 Nations, Consumers and Personal Histories
Suppose the world consists of a finite set K of different countries — or, more
generally, different physical locations — indexed by k. To allow time for
migration as well as uncertainty, consider an intertemporal Arrow–Debreu
economy in which D is the finite set of relevant date–event pairs, with a tree
structure starting at d = 0.
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Suppose there is a fixed continuum of consumers I indexed by i, with I
as a σ-field of measurable subsets. Also, let ν be the appropriate measure,
so that (I, I, ν) is the atomless measure space of consumers.2
Each individual consumer i ∈ I is assumed to have a migration plan in
the form of a mapping kiD : D → K. Thus, ki(d) indicates the nation in
which consumer i plans to reside and function as an economic agent at each
date–event pair d ∈ D. Obviously, the set of all possible migration plans is
the (finite) Cartesian product set KD. At d = 0, history determines ki(0)
as the nation which the consumer inhabits as the economy starts.
Our model of how migration affects congestion will recognize that differ-
ent kinds of consumer may place different burdens on the public sectors of
the nations or localities they inhabit. So we extend the description of each
consumer i ∈ I to include, for each date–event d ∈ D, an index ei(d) ∈ E
of all relevant demographic or other household characteristics affecting the
costs of providing local public goods. Examples of such characteristics are
a particular household’s entitlements in different date–event pairs for pub-
licly provided education, health services, welfare payments, pensions, etc.
Essentially, in the static model of Conley and Wooders (1996, 1997), each
e ∈ E is a “crowding type.” We assume that the range E of possible char-
acteristics is a finite set, and let eiD = 〈ei(d)〉d∈D ∈ ED denote consumer
i’s characteristic history.
Each consumer i’s migration plan and characteristic history are jointly
represented by the pair (kiD, eiD) which belongs to the Cartesian product
domain KD × ED of personal histories. For the remainder of the paper it
will be convenient to represent each consumer i’s chosen personal history by
2In Hammond and Sempere (2006) we discuss why it might be better not to let I be
the unit interval, and how to construct the appropriate non-atomic probability measure ν.
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indicator variables defined by
mik(e, d) :=
 1 if ki(d) = k and ei(d) = e;0 otherwise. (1)
In this way the set M of possible personal histories mi becomes a subset of
REDK , but with each member having exactly one component mik(e, d) equal
to 1 for each d ∈ D, with all others equal to 0. In particular, each mi has
exactly #D non-zero components.
2.2 Demographic Histories as Congestion Profiles
The proportion of the world’s inhabitants living in country k and having
characteristic e at date–event d is given by
µk(e, d) := ν
({ i ∈ I | mik(e, d) = 1 }) . (2)
So at any date–event d ∈ D, the statistical distribution of consumers in
country k having different characteristics e ∈ E is specified by the vec-
tor of proportions µEk (d) ∈ RE+. Let µEDk := 〈µEk (d)〉d∈D ∈ RED+ denote
the “national demographic history.” Let µEDK := 〈µEDk 〉k∈K denote the
corresponding “world demographic history,” which we usually just call a





Assume that there is a finite set G(d) of dated contingent private commodi-
ties in each date–event d ∈ D. Suppose this set is partioned into pairwise
disjoint components T (d) andNk(d) (k ∈ K), whereNk(d) is the set of goods
in date–event d specific to country k that are not traded internationally, and
T (d) is the set of internationally traded goods. We assume that each set
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Nk(d) includes all relevant kinds of labour, since labour is not traded directly
across borders. Rather, migrants move across borders to supply labour in
other nations. Then the relevant set of dated contingent commodities is
G := ∪d∈DG(d) and the finite-dimensional commodity space is RG.
Let Gk(d) := T (d)∪Nk(d) denote the subset of goods that can be traded
in nation k at date–event d. Also, let Gk := ∪d∈DGk(d) denote the subset of
all goods that can be traded in nation k; these will be the goods which can
appear as inputs and/or outputs in production activities within nation k.
Finally, let G(m) := ∪d∈DGk(d)(d) denote the subset that can be traded by
any consumer with the personal history m = (kD, eD).
2.4 Fixed Public Goods and Congestion Profile
A Pareto efficient allocation of private and public goods also requires an
efficient allocation of congestion, with the appropriate level of the profile
µEDK . However, there is no need here to assume that any such efficient
allocation of total congestion occurs.
Instead, we consider what happens when public good provision is fixed
at its status quo value, as is the congestion profile µEDK . In particular, indi-
viduals are allowed to migrate and to change their congestion characteristics.
But in the equilibrium we look for there must be other individuals choosing
to make offsetting changes whose overall effect is that the congestion pro-
file µEDK remains at its status quo level µ¯EDK . That is, individuals are
restricted to exchanging places in equilibrium. Even so, in addition to the
usual gains from trade, there can still be gains from migration in the form
of appropriate population exchanges between different countries, allowing
each household to go wherever it wants taking into account its preferences,
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its opportunities to earn labour income, and also what residence charges it
is expected to pay.
3 Consumers’ Characteristics
3.1 Feasible Sets
Each consumer i ∈ I will be modelled as choosing some pair (xi,mi) that
consists of a net trade vector xi ∈ RG and a personal history mi ∈ REDK .
Different personal histories obviously incur different costs. Also, different
vectors of public goods in different localities allow different quantities of
private goods to be consumed, depending on the consumer’s own personal
history, including migration decisions. For these reasons, we assume that
each consumer i’s net trade vector xi ∈ RG is restricted to a conditional
feasible set Xi(mi) that is compatible with the chosen personal history mi ∈
M and the frozen public good vector. Formally:
(A.1) For every personal history mi ∈ M , each consumer i ∈ I has a (pos-
sibly empty) closed conditional feasible set Xi(mi) satisfying xig = 0 for all
g 6∈ G(mi). Also, the free disposal of i’s tradable commodities condition
holds — requiring that, whenever xi ∈ Xi(mi) and x˜i = xi with x˜ig = 0 for
all g 6∈ G(mi), then x˜i ∈ Xi(mi). In addition, each consumer i ∈ I has a
non-empty overall conditional feasible set defined by
Xi := { (xi,mi) ∈ RG ×KD | xi ∈ Xi(mi) }. (3)
3.2 Preferences
Given fixed public good vectors in each locality, consumers will be allowed to
have preferences over combinations of personal histories and net trade vec-
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tors. In our continuum economy, there is no need to assume that preferences
are convex. So our next assumption is:
(A.2) Each consumer i ∈ I has a weak preference relation %i defined on Xi
that is reflexive, complete, transitive, continuous, as well as weakly mono-
tonic in i’s tradable commodities in the sense that, whenever xi ∈ Xi(mi)
and x˜i = xi with x˜ig = 0 for all g 6∈ G(mi) and x˜ig > xig for all g ∈ G(mi),
then (x˜i,mi) i (xi,mi), where i denotes the corresponding strict prefer-
ence relation.
Note that (xi,mi) ∈ Xi ⇐⇒ (xi,mi) %i (xi,mi) because %i is com-
plete. So each consumer i’s feasible set Xi and preference relation %i are
characterized completely by the graph
Γi := {(xi,mi, x˜i, m˜i) ∈ RG ×M × RG ×M | (xi,mi) %i (x˜i, m˜i)}
of %i. By continuity, this is a closed subset of RG ×M × RG ×M .
3.3 Characteristics
As has become standard since the work of Hildenbrand (1974), we assume:
(A.3) The consumer characteristic space Θ of feasible sets X and of prefer-
ence relations %, as represented by their closed graphs Γ, is endowed with
the topology of closed convergence and the associated Borel σ-field B. More-
over, the mapping i 7→ Γi from I to RG×M ×RG×M is measurable w.r.t.
the respective σ-fields I and B.
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4 Producers, Feasible Allocations and Profits
4.1 National and International Production
In this paper there is no need to pay attention to individual producers or
their net output vectors. Instead, all our analysis will involve the aggregate
net output vector yk and aggregate production set of each nation k ∈ K.
We assume:
(A.4) Each nation k ∈ K, given its fixed public environment and status
quo congestion levels, has a closed and convex conditional production set
Yk ⊂ RG whose members are vectors with components that measure the
net outputs per head of world population. In addition, ykg = 0 whenever
g 6∈ Gk and yk ∈ Yk — i.e., Yk ⊂ RGk × {0}. Finally, there is free disposal
of nation k’s tradable commodities in the sense that, if yk ∈ Yk and y˜k 5 yk
with y˜k ∈ RGk × {0}, then y˜k ∈ Yk.
We allow that 0 6∈ Yk because of the need to produce the status quo
public good vector in each nation.
4.2 Feasible Allocations and the Status Quo
An allocation (xI ,mI ,yK) is a jointly measurable function i 7→ (xi,mi) ∈
RG×REDK specifying both each individual’s net trade vector and personal
history, together with an international profile of net output vectors yK =
〈yk〉k∈K ∈ YK =
∏
k∈K Y
k. The allocation (xI ,mI ,yK) is feasible if:
(i) (xi,mi) ∈ Xi a.e. in I;








Condition (iii) requires the average net demand vector of all consumers
to equal the aggregate net output of producers per head of world population.
The combined gains from free trade and migration will accrue from an
allocation that is Pareto superior to a prespecified status quo feasible allo-
cation (x¯I , m¯I , y¯K). Let m¯I denote the status quo distribution of personal





Relative to the status quo, for each i ∈ I, let
X¯i := { (xi,mi) ∈ Xi | (xi,mi) %i (x¯i, m¯i) } (4)
denote the set of i’s allocations that are weakly preferred to the status quo.
Assume that:
(A.5) For each i ∈ I, the set X¯i has a lower bound xi ∈ RG such that
(xi,mi) ∈ X¯i implies xi = xi; also, the mapping i 7→ xi is integrable with a
mean lower bound x :=
∫
I x
idν that is a finite vector in RG.
4.3 Bounded Production Sets
By (A.5), any feasible allocation (xI ,mI ,yK) with (xi,mi) ∈ X¯i for a.e.
i ∈ I must satisfy x 5 ∫I xidν =∑k∈K yk. Define the set
YK(x) := {yK ∈ YK |
∑
k∈K
yk = x } (5)
of feasible international production allocations that this inequality. Assume
that:
(A.6) The set YK(x) is bounded.
Thus, if aggregate global inputs are enough to allow an allocation that is
Pareto non-inferior to the status quo, there are bounds on the outputs in
each separate country, as well as in the international economy as a whole.
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Following the idea pioneered by Arrow and Debreu (1954), (A.6) implies
there are compact sets Ck ⊂ RG for each k ∈ K which are large enough
for the Cartesian product
∏
k∈K Ck to contain Y
K(x) within its interior.
Hence, any feasible allocation (xI ,mI ,yK) with (xi,mi) ∈ X¯i for a.e. i ∈ I
must satisfy yk ∈ Yˆk := Yk ∩ Ck for all k ∈ K.
4.4 Profit Maximization
The domain of possible commodity price vectors is allowed to be the whole
of RG+. Later, Section 8 will discuss when there exists a non-zero equilibrium
commodity price vector.
Assume that producers in each nation k ∈ K maximize profits taking
as given the price vector p = 0, the fixed vector of public goods they have
to supply, and the fixed national congestion profile µ¯EDk . For each nation
k ∈ K and price vector p = 0, because each Yˆk is compact, we can define
ηk(p) := arg
pik(p) :=
maxyk { p yk | yk ∈ Yˆk } (6)
as the (non-empty) set of profit maximizing aggregate net output vectors
and the associated aggregate profit per head of world population. Note that
pik(p) may be negative because of the cost of producing public goods in
nation k. Note too that, as Arrow and Debreu (1954) argue, any feasible
allocation (xI ,mI ,yK) with (xi,mi) ∈ X¯i for a.e. i ∈ I and yk ∈ ηk(p) for
any k ∈ K must satisfy yk ∈ argmaxyk{ p yk | yk ∈ Yk }.
4.5 Residence Charges
In our model of the world economy, migration creates externalities by adding
to (or reducing) the congestion cost of providing public goods in both the
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source and destination localities. Given any fixed congestion profile µEDK ,
a constrained Pareto efficient allocation of these externalities can be en-
sured by instituting a suitable Pigouvian tax scheme. The allocation is only
constrained Pareto efficient because nothing is done to choose appropriate
national public environments and congestion levels.
The Pigouvian tax scheme requires levying a net congestion or residence
charge tk(e, d) on each consumer of characteristic e living in country k at
date–event d. Then consumers choose their own personal histories, as well
as their net trade vectors, subject to a budget constraint that reflects the
appropriate residence charges for living in each location in each date–event.
Let t ∈ REDK denote the vector 〈tk(e, d)〉(e,d,k)∈E×D×K of all residence
charges. Each nation k ∈ K is assumed to set its own residence charges
tEDk = 〈tk(e, d)〉(e,d)∈E×D in order to clear markets with its congestion profile
frozen at the status quo level µ¯EDk .
An extended price vector is a non-zero pair (p, t) ∈ (RG+×REDK)\{(0, 0)}.
4.6 Constrained Allocations
Given the status quo congestion profile µ¯EDK , define its support
S := { (e, d, k) ∈ E ×D ×K | µ¯k(e, d) > 0 }. (7)
In order to maintain the status quo congestion profile, agents must be dis-
suaded from choosing any personal history outside the set
MS := {m ∈M | mk(e, d) = 1 =⇒ (e, d, k) ∈ S }. (8)
In Section 7.4 below, we will show how this can be achieved by setting high
enough residence charges tk(e, d) for all (e, d, k) 6∈ S.
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Furthermore, note that the status quo for agent i satisfies m¯i 6∈ MS
unless m¯ik(e, d) = 1 for some (e, d, k) ∈ (E × D × K) \ S — i.e., for some
(e, d, k) such that µ¯k(e, d) = 0. Of course, this can happen only for a null
set. It follows that m¯i ∈ MS a.e. in I. From now on, we disregard those
i ∈ I for whom m¯i 6∈MS . Also, define each consumer i’s constrained set as
X¯iS := { (xi,mi) ∈ X¯i | mi ∈MS }. (9)
5 Sagacious Wealth Distribution Rules
5.1 Wealth Distribution Rules
A wealth distribution rule wI(p, t) specifies each consumer i’s wealth level
wi as a function of the extended price vector (p, t), and so determines each
consumer’s budget constraint p xi + tmi ≤ wi(p, t).
Budget feasibility for the world as a whole requires that∫
I
wi(p, t) dν =
∑
k∈K
pik(p) + t µ¯EDK . (10)
The last term arises because the revenue from residence charges can either
be distributed to consumers directly, or else used to reduce the losses of
firms which provide public goods and so lower the taxes consumers must
pay to subsidize these firms’ losses. International transfers are allowed; see
Hammond and Sempere (1995) for a discussion of when they can be avoided
in the absence of migration.
5.2 The Normalized Price Domain
In each date–event d ∈ D, every individual i ∈ I has to choose precisely one
(k, e) ∈ K ×E such that mik(e, d) = 1. This implies that only the algebraic
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differences tk(e, d) − tk′(e′, d) between the residence charges in different lo-
cations k, k′ for different kinds of household e, e′ in each date–event d are
relevant to the left-hand side p xi+
∑
d∈D tk(e, d)mk(e, d) of the budget con-
straint p xi+tmi ≤ wi(p, t). The absolute values of tk(e, d) are unimportant,
except insofar as they amount to uniform head taxes (or subsidies) affecting
everybody in the world, regardless of location k and characteristic e. For
this reason, we can always normalize prices by subtracting the minimum
residence charge, so that in every date–event d ∈ D the cheapest location
has a normalized residence charge equal to zero.
Thus, let TS denote the set of vectors tS ∈ RS+ of residence charges
satisfying min(e,k) { tk(e, d) | (e, d, k) ∈ S } = 0 for all d ∈ D. Then define






tk(e, d) = 1 } (11)
as the set of normalized price systems. Note that whenever (p, tS) ∈ ∆S one
has
∑
g∈G pg ≤ 1 and tSm ≥ 0 for all m ∈MS .
5.3 Sagacious Rules
Given any extended price vector (p, t) ∈ RG+ × REDK , define
e¯iS(p, t) := inf
xi,mi
{ p xi + tmi | (xi,mi) ∈ X¯iS } (12)
This is the infimum wealth consumer i needs to sustain the status quo stan-
dard of living, subject to the constraint mi ∈ MS . Note how (A.5) implies
that e¯iS(p, t) > −∞.
Definition: The wealth distribution rule wI(p, t) is sagacious if, for all
p = 0 and t ∈ REDK , it satisfies (10) (i.e., it is budget feasible) and:
(i) whenever t˜ ∈ REDK satisfies t˜k(e, d) = tk(e, d) for all (e, d, k) ∈ S,
then wi(p, t) = wi(p, t˜) for all i ∈ I;
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k∈K pik(p) + t µ¯
EDK implies that wi(p, t) > e¯iS(p, t)
a.e. in I.
Here part (i) reflects the idea that only the prices of residence permits for
triples (e, d, k) ∈ S are relevant for the equilibrium whose existence we wish
to demonstrate. So the wealth distribution rule should not depend on the
prices of other residence permits. Parts (ii) and (iii) are obvious adaptations
of Grandmont and McFadden’s (1972) original definition.
Note how expenditure minimization implies that e¯iS(p, t) ≤ p x¯i + t m¯i
a.e. in I, whereas profit maximization implies pik(p) ≥ p y¯k for all k ∈ K.
Together with feasibility of the status quo allocation, these imply that∫
I
e¯iS(p, t) dν ≤
∫
I
(p x¯i + t m¯i) dν =
∑
k∈K




pik(p) + t µ¯EDK
for all p = 0 and t ∈ REDK . It follows that (ii) is always possible. So are (i)
and (iii) if, for instance, we choose
wi(p, t) ≡ e¯iS(p, t) + θi
[∑
k∈K









i dν = 1. The key Lemma 1 in Hammond and Sempere (2006)
confirms that such a rule is integrable w.r.t. i, and continuous w.r.t. (p, t).
After this discussion, an obvious assumption is that:
(A.7) The wealth distribution rule wI(p, t) is integrable w.r.t. i, continuous
w.r.t. (p, t), and sagacious.
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6 Constrained Compensated Equilibrium
6.1 Conditional Walrasian Equilibrium
Given the frozen levels of public goods and congestion profile, as well as the
wealth distribution rule wI(p, t), and the particular extended price vector
(p, t) ∈ RG+ × REDK , define each consumer i’s conditional budget set as
Bi(p, t) := { (xi,mi) ∈ Xi | p xi + tmi ≤ wi(p, t) }. (13)
Then consumer i’s conditional Walrasian or uncompensated demand set
γi(p, t) is defined as
{ (xˆi, mˆi) ∈ Bi(p, t) | (xi,mi) i (xˆi, mˆi) =⇒ p xi + tmi > wi(p, t) }. (14)
It is easy to see how assumptions (A.1), (A.2), and (A.7) together imply that
γi(p, t) ⊂ X¯i a.e. in I. In fact, the constraint (xi,mi) ∈ X¯i cannot bind
when the wealth distribution rule is sagacious and so wi(p, t) ≥ e¯iS(p, t).




I dν, a conditional Walrasian equilibrium is a feasible
allocation (xˆI , mˆI , yˆK), together with an extended price vector (pˆ, tˆ) ∈ RG+×




mˆi dν = µ¯EDK ;
(ii) yˆk ∈ ηk(pˆ) for all k ∈ K;
(iii) (xˆi, mˆi) ∈ γi(pˆ, tˆ) a.e. in I.
Using (4) and (9), we also define the constrained budget set
B¯iS(p, t) := { (xi,mi) ∈ X¯iS | p xi + tmi ≤ wi(p, t) }. (15)
Consumer i’s constrained compensated demand set γ¯iSC (p, t) is defined as
{ (xˆi, mˆi) ∈ B¯iS(p, t) | (xi,mi) %i (xˆi, mˆi) =⇒ p xi + tmi ≥ wi(p, t) }. (16)
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A constrained compensated equilibrium is like a conditional Walrasian equi-
librium in that it satisfies parts (i) and (ii) of the definition, but only the
modified version of part (iii) requiring that (xˆi, mˆi) ∈ γ¯iSC (pˆ, tˆ) a.e. in I. Of
course, this implies that (xˆi, mˆi) %i (x¯i, m¯i) a.e. in I.
6.2 A First Existence Result
Our first result is that, given the fixed congestion levels µ¯EDK , there exists
a constrained compensated equilibrium.
Lemma 1: Suppose assumptions (A.1)–(A.7) are all satisfied. Then there
is a constrained compensated equilibrium (xˆI , mˆI , yˆK , pˆ, tˆ).
Proof: We apply Lemma 2 in Hammond and Sempere (2006), to the
commodity space RG × RS . It demonstrates existence of a constrained
compensated equilibrium with free disposal. That is, there must exist
(x˜I , mˆI , y˜K , pˆ, tˆ) satisfying (x˜i, mˆi) ∈ γ¯iSC (pˆ, tˆ) for a.e. i ∈ I, as well as







mˆik(e, d) dν ≤ µ¯k(e, d) (17)
for all (e, d, k) ∈ S. But by definition (7), for all (e, d, k) 6∈ S one has
µ¯k(e, d) = 0 = mˆik(e, d) a.e. in I. Also, definition (1) guarantees that∑
(k,e)∈K×E













Combining this with (17), it follows that
∫
I mˆ
i dν = µ¯EDK .
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Next, arguing as in the proof of Lemma 3 in Hammond and Sempere
(2006), the free disposal properties implied by (A.1) and (A.2), or alterna-
tively by (A.6), guarantee the existence of an alternative pair (xˆI , yˆK) with
xˆi = x˜i for almost all i ∈ I and yˆk 5 y˜k for all k ∈ K satisfying pˆ xˆi = pˆ x˜i






(xˆI , mˆI , yˆK , pˆ, tˆ) is the required constrained compensated equilibrium.
7 Bounding the Prices of Residence Permits
7.1 First Example with Zero Commodity Prices
For the following two examples, the only possible extended price vectors in
constrained compensated equilibrium may have zero prices for all physical
commodities in the economy, with non-zero prices only for residence permits.
Because of non-satiation in commodities, such an extended price vector can
never be a Walrasian equilibrium. This is true even though the examples
satisfy assumptions (A.1)–(A.6).
Suppose there is a single good, so #G = 1, and just one date–event,
so D = {0}. Assume the set K consists of two nations, labelled A and B.
Finally, assume there is only one crowding type, which can therefore be
ignored. Thus, each i ∈ I has a personal history ki ∈ K = {A,B }.
Each consumer i ∈ I is assumed to have a conditional feasible set
Xi(A) = Xi(B) which, for some real lower bound xi < 0, is equal to the
closed half-line [xi,∞) ⊂ R, independent of the choice of residence.
In the first example we assume that the lower bounds xi of all individuals
i ∈ I are distributed with a positive continuous density over the whole of
the closed half-line (−∞,−1] ⊂ R. For example, the distribution could be
truncated normal. Finally, assume each consumer i ∈ I has preferences on
18
the space [xi,∞)×{A,B } of net trade/country pairs which are represented
by the utility function ui(x, k) defined for all x = xi by
ui(x,A) := x− 2xi and ui(x,B) := x.
Suppose the status quo allocation is autarkic, with all consumers residing
in B. Hence, (x¯i, k¯i) = (0, B) for all i ∈ I, and S = {B}. Then the only
feasible allocation with the same congestion profile and with (xˆi, kˆi) %i
(0, B) for a.e. i ∈ I must have kˆi = B and xˆi ≥ 0. But then feasibility
implies xˆi = 0 for a.e. i ∈ I. Hence, the only such allocation combines
autarky with immobility.
Let wI(p, t) be any wealth distribution rule satisfying (A.7). In order
for (p, tA, tB) to be a consstrained compensated equilibrium price vector, for
a.e. i ∈ I one must have p xi ≥ p xˆi = 0 whenever xi ≥ xˆi = 0. So p ≥ 0.
Furthermore, for a.e. i ∈ I, whenever xi ≥ 2xi one has (xi, A) %i (0, B)
and so p xi+tA ≥ tB. In particular, tA ≥ tB when xi = 0 and 2 p xi+tA ≥ tB
when xi = 2xi. Our assumptions imply, however, that no matter how
large the real positive constant c may be, there exists a non-null set Ic of
individuals i ∈ I for whom xi ≤ −c and so p c ≤ 2(tA − tB). This is only
possible if p ≤ 0; therefore p = 0.3
7.2 Second Example with Zero Commodity Prices
The second example shares many features in common with the first. There
are two types of consumers, however, each with a common distribution of
the lower bounds xi represented by a continuous density function restricted
to the interval [−2,−1]. Consumers of congestion type a have preferences
3This example also satisfies assumptions (A.8)–(A.11) set out below. In particular,
(A.9) is trivially satisfied because S = {B} and so ∆S collapses to the single point {µ¯S}.
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represented by a utility function ui(x, k) with
ui(x,A) := x and ui(x,B) := x+ 3,
whereas those of congestion type b have preferences represented by
ui(x,A) := x and ui(x,B) := x.
The status quo is autarky with all type a consumers living in A, but positive
proportions of type b consumers living in each country.
As in the first example, the only feasible allocation with the same con-
gestion profile and with (xˆi, kˆi) %i (0, B) for a.e. i ∈ I must combine au-
tarky with immobility. Also, again as in the first example, given any wealth
distribution rule wI(p, t) satisfying (A.7), in order for (p, tA, tB) to be a
constrained compensated equilibrium price vector, one must have p ≥ 0.
For type a consumers, compensated equilibrium requires tB + p xi ≥ tA
for all xi ≥ −2, so tB − 2p ≥ tA. For type b consumers, compensated
equilibrium requires tA + p xi ≥ tB for all xi ≥ 0, so tA ≥ tB. Hence
tB − 2p ≥ tA ≥ tB, which is only possible if p ≤ 0; therefore p = 0.4
7.3 Boundedly Sagacious Rules
The crucial feature of the example in Section 7.1 is the lack of any uniform
upper bound on the amount individuals are willing to pay for being allowed
to move from B to A. An extra assumption will bound what consumers can
afford to pay for relevant changes in personal history.
Let 1G denote the vector (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ RG. The sagacious wealth
distribution rule wI(p, t) is said to be boundedly sagacious if there ex-
ists a uniform scalar bound α ∈ R+ such that the status quo allocation
4This second example also satisfies assumptions (A.7*) and (A.9)–(A.11) set out below.
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(x¯I , m¯I , y¯K), and the lower bounds xi (i ∈ I) of (A.5), together satisfy
wi(p, t) ≤ p (xi + α 1G) + t m¯i for a.e. i ∈ I, and for all (p, t) ∈ RG+ ×REDK .
After this definition, we strengthen (A.7) by assuming that:
(A.7*) The wealth distribution rule wI(p, t) is integrable w.r.t. i, continuous
w.r.t. (p, t), and boundedly sagacious.
A wealth distribution rule wI(p, t) satisfying (A.7*) exists provided that
e¯iS(p, t) ≤ p (xi + α 1G) + t m¯i. But e¯iS(p, t) ≤ p x¯i + t m¯i and p = 0. So an
obvious sufficient condition allowing (A.7*) to be satisfied is that the status
quo net trade vectors satisfy x¯i 5 xi+α 1G for a.e. i ∈ I, with α independent
of i. This assumption is actually quite reasonable, but unnecessarily strong.
7.4 The Restricted Price Domain
In Section 4.6 it was claimed that setting residence charges sufficiently high
would dissuade consumers from choosing any personal history outside the
set MS . Given that m¯i ∈MS for a.e. i ∈ I, this claim can now be justified
by the following result:
Lemma 2: Assume (A.1)–(A.6) and (A.7*) are satisfied, and (p, t) ∈ ∆S
with
tk(e, d) > α+max
m
{ tm | m ∈MS } for all (e, d, k) 6∈ S. (18)
Then any i ∈ I with m¯i ∈ MS has mi ∈ MS for all (xi,mi) ∈ Bi(p, t), as
well as X¯iS = X¯i and B¯iS(p, t) = Bi(p, t) ∩ X¯i.
Proof: Consider any (xi,mi) ∈ B¯iS(p, t). By (A.5) one has (xi,mi) ∈ X¯i
and so xi = xi. But p = 0, implying that p xi + tmi ≥ p xi + tmi. Then
(A.7*) implies that p xi + tmi ≤ wi(p, t) ≤ p (xi + α 1G) + t m¯i and so
t (mi − m¯i) ≤ pα 1G ≤ α, given that p 1G ≤ 1 for all (p, t) ∈ ∆S .
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Consider any (e, d, k) 6∈ S. Because m¯i ∈ MS , the hypothesis of the
lemma implies that tmi ≤ pα 1G + t m¯i < tk(e, d). Because t = 0 and
mik(e, d) ∈ { 0, 1 } for all (e, d, k) ∈ E ×D ×K, it follows that mik(e, d) = 0
for all (e, d, k) 6∈ S — i.e., that mi ∈MS .
The rest of the proof is immediate from definitions (8) and (9).
For the conclusion of Lemma 2 to hold, it is enough to make the resi-
dence charges tk(e, d) sufficiently high for all (e, d, k) 6∈ S. Indeed, consider
a constrained compensated equilibrium price vector (pˆ, tˆS) that clears mar-
kets for commodities g ∈ G and for residence permits (e, d, k) ∈ S. Then
Lemma 2 states that, given any normalized price system (p, t) ∈ ∆S as in
(11), residence charges for (e, d, k) 6∈ S can be set high enough to make the
constraints mi ∈ MS self-enforcing. Accordingly, from now on these other
residence charges can be effectively ignored. We refer simply to a “compen-
sated equilibrium”, without mentioning the constraints mi ∈MS . Lemmas
1 and 2 assure us that such an equilibrium exists.
7.5 A Desirability Assumption
The example in Section 7.2 shows that our assumptions so far still do not
exclude a zero commodity price vector in compensated equilibrium. To
ensure that at least one divisible commodity has a positive price when some
commodities are indivisible, Broome (1972) introduced the assumption that
divisible goods were overridingly desirable — see also Mas-Colell (1977). In
our model, for all i ∈ I, given any (xi,mi) ∈ Xi and m˜i ∈ M , this would
require the existence of an x˜i ∈ Xi(m˜i) such that (x˜i, m˜i) i (xi,mi).
Yet some personal histories may be very distasteful to some individuals.
Or they may involve excessive migration, thus making them very expensive
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and inconvenient, if not entirely impossible. Accordingly, we define the set
M¯ iS := {mi ∈MS | ∃xi ∈ RG : (xi,mi) ∈ X¯i } (19)
of i’s personal histories in MS which, when combined with a sufficiently
desirable commodity bundle, are non-inferior to the status quo. Now we
can state the following restricted version of overriding desirability:
(A.8) For almost all i ∈ I, whenever (xi,mi) ∈ X¯i and m˜i ∈ M¯ iS , there
exists x˜i ∈ Xi(m˜i) such that (x˜i, m˜i) %i (xi,mi).
7.6 Interiority
The final assumption in this section is an interiority condition of a kind that
is familiar in general equilibrium existence proofs.
First, for each d ∈ D, let S(d) := { (e, k) ∈ E × K | (e, d, k) ∈ S }
denote the section of S for the given date–event d. Let ∆S(d) denote the
unit simplex in the associated Euclidean space RS(d). Thus,
∆S(d) := { 〈µk(e, d)〉(e,k)∈S(d) ∈ RS(d)+ |
∑
(e,k)∈S(d)
µk(e, d) = 1 }.
Of course, the Cartesian product
∏
d∈D ∆
S(d) is a subset of the non-negative
orthant RS+. We assume:















To illustrate this assumption, suppose some environmental disaster were
to compel a small enough proportion of the population to change their per-
sonal histories from the status quo, while still remaining within the set MS .
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Then (A.9) requires that, with sufficient resources and with some population
exchanges from this modified status quo, one can still reach an allocation
that is Pareto non-inferior to the original status quo.
7.7 A Non-Zero Commodity Price Vector
Lemma 3: Suppose assumptions (A.1)–(A.6), (A.7*) and (A.8)–(A.9) are
satisfied. Then there is a compensated equilibrium (xˆI , mˆI , yˆK , pˆ, tˆ) which
satisfies (xˆi, mˆi) ∈ X¯i a.e. in I, with pˆ > 0.
Proof: By Lemmas 1 and 2, there is a constrained compensated equi-
librium (xˆI , mˆI , yˆK , pˆ, tˆ) satisfying (xˆi, mˆi) ∈ X¯i a.e. in I. This is also a
compensated equilibrium provided we make tˆ satisfy (18). So we only have
to show that pˆ > 0.
Suppose pˆ = 0 and consider any m˜i ∈ M¯ iS . Under assumption (A.8),
there exists x˜i ∈ Xi(m˜i) such that (x˜i, m˜i) %i (xˆi, mˆi). Because pˆ = 0,
the definition of compensated equilibrium implies that tˆ m˜i ≥ tˆ mˆi. In












idν, and so tˆ m¯i = tˆ mˆi a.e. in I. It follows that tˆ mi ≥ tˆ m¯i
whenever mi ∈ M¯ iS , and so tˆ µ ≥ tˆ µ¯ whenever µ ∈ ∫I M¯ iSdν. This evi-
dently contradicts (A.9).
Hence, by contraposition, if (A.1)–(A.6), (A.7*) and (A.8)–(A.9) are all
satisfied, then only pˆ > 0 is possible.
8 Conditional Walrasian Equilibrium
Our one remaining task is to show that, in our economy with fixed public
goods, a fixed congestion profile, and a boundedly sagacious wealth distri-
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bution rule, there exists a conditional Walrasian equilibrium market clearing
extended price vector which includes residence charges. To do this, we shall
provide additional assumptions ensuring that the conditional compensated
equilibrium found in Lemma 3 is also a conditional Walrasian equilibrium.
The extra assumptions are required to overcome an additional complication
due to boundary problems, as discussed in the next subsection.
8.1 Convexity and the Cheaper Point Lemma
By construction, a sagacious wealth distribution rule generates lump-sum
transfers enabling each consumer to afford at least the status quo standard





k∈K pik(p) + tµ¯
EDK , then almost every
consumer i will have some cheaper point (xi,mi) in the conditional feasible
set Xi that satisfies p xi + tmi < wi(p, t). However, in our model, this may
not be enough to prevent a non-null set of individuals i ∈ I from demanding
some pair (xˆi, mˆi) with a net trade vector xˆi that is a cheapest point of
the relevant conditional feasible set Xi(mˆi) given the chosen personal his-
tory mˆi. This creates a boundary problem which could prevent the existence
of conditional Walrasian equilibrium.
This problem will be resolved by making use of two additional assump-
tions, similar to those used in Hammond and Sempere (2006). First:
(A.10) For every i ∈ I and mi ∈M , the set Xi(mi) is convex.
This convexity assumption enables us to use the following extension of
the usual cheaper point lemma.
Lemma 4: Suppose that (A.1), (A.2) and (A.10) are satisfied. For any
fixed pair i ∈ I and (p, t) ∈ ∆S satisfying (18), let (xˆi, mˆi) ∈ γiSC (p, t) be a
constrained compensated demand. Suppose too that, whenever (xi,mi) i
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(xˆi, mˆi), there exists a “conditional cheaper point” x˜i ∈ Xi(mi) satisfying
p x˜i + tmi < wi(p, t). Then (xˆi, mˆi) ∈ γi(p, t).
Proof: The proof is virtually identical to that of Lemma 3 in Hammond
and Sempere (2006); there is just extra notation because mi is included in
the commodity space and t in the price vector.
8.2 Dispersion
Next, we invoke an additional “dispersion” assumption similar to that used
in Hammond and Sempere (2006), where it is further discussed and analysed.
To state this assumption formally in the present framework, first define
wi(p, t,mi) := min
xi
{ p xi + tmi | xi ∈ Xi(mi) }
as the minimum wealth needed by consumer i at prices (p, t) ∈ ∆S with
p > 0 in order to sustain the personal history mi. If the minimum does not
exist, we take wi(p, t,mi) := +∞. Under assumption (A.3), for each fixed
m ∈MS the mapping i 7→ wi(p, t,m) is measurable.
Recall definition (19) and then, for each m ∈M , let
M¯ :=
{
m ∈MS | ν ({ i ∈ I | m ∈ M¯ iS }) > 0}
denote the set of personal histories which are non-inferior for a non-null set
of individuals. Clearly M¯ includes the support of the status quo distribution
of personal histories m¯i (i ∈ I), but it could be much more extensive.
Finally, for each i ∈ I and each (p, t) ∈ ∆S with p > 0, define
I∗(p, t) := { i ∈ I | ∃m ∈ M¯ : wi(p, t) = wi(p, t,m) }
as the set of individuals with a critical level of wealth that is just enough to
afford one of the individual histories m ∈ M¯ . The dispersion assumption is:
(A.11) For all (p, t) ∈ ∆S with p > 0, the set I∗(p, t) has measure zero in I.
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8.3 Existence of Conditional Walrasian Equilibrium
It remains to show that there exists a conditional Walrasian equilibrium
with gains from migration.
Proposition: Under assumptions (A.1)–(A.6), (A.7*), and (A.8)–(A.11),








µ¯EDK and (xˆi, mˆi) %i (x¯i, m¯i) a.e. in I. Also, except when the status quo
is already a conditional Walrasian equilibrium, one has (xˆi, mˆi) i (x¯i, m¯i)
a.e. in I.
Proof: By Lemma 3, assumptions (A.1)–(A.6), (A.7*) and (A.8)–(A.9)
together imply that there exists a conditional compensated equilibrium
(xˆI , mˆI , yˆK , pˆ, tˆ) with pˆ > 0 and (xˆi, mˆi) ∈ X¯i a.e. in I. Using (A.10),
(A.11), and Lemma 4, the proof of Hammond and Sempere (2006, Lemma 4)
is easily adapted to show that the conditional compensated equilibrium is a
conditional Walrasian equilibrium. And also that (xˆi, mˆi) i (x¯i, m¯i) for a.e.
i ∈ I unless the status quo itself is a conditional Walrasian equilibrium.
9 Final Remarks
We have extended the results of Hammond and Sempere (2006) to an econ-
omy with public goods subject to congestion where all nations or localities
keep their public goods and congestion profiles at the status quo levels.
This still allows consumers to exchange places freely, mediated by a system
of residence charges. If the world economy could move to an improved allo-
cation of public goods together with congestion profiles, the combined gains
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to trade and migration (or changing places) would be augmented. Such
further improvements, however, go beyond the scope of this paper.
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